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Abstract
This  paper  investigates the  main determinants  affecting  the  privatisation  of  local
government services in Britain. The last decade in Britain  has  witnessed  sustained
‘top-down’ pressure to privatise local government services. We argue that empirical
policy output studies associated with the privatisation of local government services
have been largely unexplored in the literature, owing to an inordinate emphasis upon
an economic approach derived from public choice theory. Thus, spatial variations in
the privatisation of local government services in Britain have largely been neglected
and have received less attention than they should. This paper seeks to remedy this
neglect via an examination of the determinants of Compulsory Competitive Tendering,
which is one of the many forms or dimensions of privatisation at the local level. In
order to identify these determinants, path analysis was employed.
Our research found that in the path analysis for 1991  the  political  variable,  party
control,  was  the  strongest  determinant  influencing  privatisation,  whereas  in  the
analysis for 1994 the strategic variable, geographical location, was the strongest. This
implies a need for more in-depth case study analysis in order for us to understand
more fully how privatisation has been implemented.2
Determinants Affecting the Privatisation of Local Government
Services in Britain
1. Introduction
This  paper  investigates the  main determinants  affecting  the  privatisation  of  local
government services in Britain. The last decade in Britain  has  witnessed  sustained
‘top-down’ pressure to privatise local government services. We argue that empirical
policy output studies associated with the privatisation of local government services
have been largely unexplored in the literature, owing to an inordinate emphasis upon
an economic approach derived from public choice theory and also a theoretical battle
between opposed partisan views. Thus, spatial variations in the privatisation of local
government services in  Britain  have largely  been neglected  and  have received  less
attention than they should. This paper seeks to remedy this neglect via an examination
of  the  determinants  of  privatisation.  In  order  to  clarify  these  determinants,  path
analysis was employed.
In analysing the determinants of privatisation, this study  will centre  on  296  non-
metropolitan districts in England, employing data for two time-points, 1991 and 1994,
thus providing a dynamic perspective on the research question: what factors affect the
output of CCT?
This study adopts DSO (Direct Service Organisation) proportion as the dependent
variable.  Direct  Service  Organisations  comprise  the  staff  employed  by  the  local
authority itself to deliver services,  and  form  the  contractor  side  of  the  authority,
operating on a trading basis with client departments. More specifically, DSO output
or DSO proportion indicates the distribution of tenders between the DSO and private
contractors: that is, the proportion  of  tenders  won  by  the  DSO  during  the  CCT
process. In other words, it indicates the percentage of the total value of work that is
undertaken by the DSO following the competitive tendering process.3
2. Analytical framework, hypothetical causal relationships and hypotheses
2.1 Analytical framework
In this study, the analysis identifying the main factors of DSO output in the CCT
policy process is primarily based  on  the  system  model. This  implies  that  public
policy is best understood by considering the operation of a political system in its
environment and by examining how such a system maintains itself and changes over
time (Ham and Hill, 1993: 39; Hansen, 1981: 28-32).
This perspective emphasises the impact of policy environments on policy output and
the  relationships  between  environmental  variables.  This  study  highlights  the
relationships between public policy  output  and  the  social, economic  and  political
variables of local government. Fortunately, other political scientists (Boaden, 1971;
Easton, 1965; Ham and Hill, 1993; Newton and Sharpe, 1977) have worked on this
issue of uniting public policy with its environments. In Ham and Hill’s terminology
(1993: 9-10),  policy  output  studies  are studies  of  policy  outputs  which  seek  to
explain why levels of expenditure or service provision vary between areas. They take
policies as dependent variables and attempt to understand these policies in terms of
social, economic, technological and other factors.
David Easton describes a model of the ‘political system’ that we can modify to suit
our purposes. Our analytical model is based mainly on a modified version of Easton’s
system  model, thereby  providing  the  framework  within  which  the  variables  are
organised. Although some efforts have been made to refine the models of analysis,
most studies so far have been based on  the  general  theoretical approach,  where  a
simplified version of  Easton’s  general  system  model has  provided  the  framework
within which the variables have been structured (Newton, 1981: 23).
Discussions of the findings have focused mainly on the range, reliability and validity
of the variables - both dependent and independent - used in these studies (Fry and
Winters, 1970). Far less attention has been paid  to  the  interrelationships  between4
variables and their relative importance in public policy output. Since the late 1970s,
serious attempts have been made to revise and refine the models of analysis. One such
attempt  (Lewis-Beck, 1977)  has  used  path  analytical techniques  based  on  causal
models of the relationships between environmental variables underlying government
public policy.
Lewis-Beck has suggested that research efforts to date have failed to assess accurately
the relative importance of  environmental  variables  for  public  policy,  in  large  part
because they have relied on statistical  techniques  that  are inadequate for  the  task
(Lewis-Beck, 1977: 559-60).  Thus,  in  order  to  make accurate assessments  of  the
relative importance of socio-economic and political variables, and their relationships, it
is, according to Lewis-Beck, necessary to specify the underlying causal structure and
estimate its parameters. He suggests the use of ‘effect coefficients’ which combine the
direct and indirect effects of causal variables.
How, then, are we to interpret the relationships between political and environmental
characteristics? It  seems  more reasonable  to  treat  them  as  interrelated  factors  in
analysing public  policy  output,  which  public  authorities  may  influence,  than  to
consider the political variable only as  a  filter  which  other  environmental  variables
should pass through to affect the policy output.  In other words, the decision process
is affected by a number of factors surrounding the policy process, including political
and other environmental variables. In this model we interpret these relationships of
variables as a causal chain, and assume that there are direct and indirect causal links
between environmental variables and policy output.
2.2 Hypothetical causal relationships
There  is  a  substantial  body  of  work  on  the  behavioural  determinants  of  local
government policy output, drawn from a variety of different intellectual disciplines,
including economics, political science and organisational theory (e.g.  Barnett  et al.,
1990; Danziger, 1976; Ferris, 1986; Sharpe and Newton, 1984; Tiebout, 1956). Such5
research has mainly (but not entirely) focused on expenditure or revenue. Also, it has
rarely been concerned specifically with CCT or privatisation policy, in spite of the
fact that since the early 1980s CCT or privatisation policy has played a major role in
British local government service provision. Much of the  literature  concerning  local
authorities  in  Britain  deals  with  overall  expenditure  levels,  fiscal  decisions  or
budgetary decision- making.
In the meantime, most of the literature on CCT has taken a descriptive, institutional
and political approach. This has concentrated on changes in government policy, the
response of local authorities and public unions to CCT and the savings arising from
competition. Much less attention has been paid to the determinants of CCT policy
output. All in all, the output study employing an analytical approach has a lot to
commend it as a method for elucidating the policy process. This study employs such
an approach in building a framework for the analysis.
It seems that there is no generally agreed method of assessing the impact of factors
affecting  policy  output  (Page  et al.,1990:  44).  This  study  addresses  an  array  of
environmental  and  contextual  factors,  including  economic,  political,  demographic,
strategic and  organisational  factors  and  DSO  proportion  (DSO  output),  primarily
employing  the  system  theory.  In  the  absence  of  a  comprehensive  theory,  it  is
necessary to create hypothetical causal relationships for analysis in accordance with
the purpose of the research.
Figure  1  shows  a  hypothetical  framework for  the  analysis  of  DSO  output.  The
elements shown  have mostly  been dealt  with  in  the  field of  policy  analysis  and
organisational analysis. However, they are supplemented in line with the purpose of
the research, and the interrelationships between the posited variables are to a certain
extent intuitive and exploratory. In the following section, we discuss the anticipated
effect  of  these  sets  of  variables  on  DSO  output,  touching  upon  the  theoretical
expectations and empirical findings.6
Figure 1 Hypothetical causal relationships for the analysis of DSO output
It should be pointed out here that any comprehensive analysis of DSO is incomplete
by definition if policy situation is not included with the other contextual variables.
Therefore, this analytical framework also deals with the strategic variables associated
with the policy situation, which other studies in the literature on policy output have
not considered.
2.3 Hypotheses
Urban researchers (Haworth et al., 1978; Hirsch, 1982) analysing urbanisation and
urban growth have identified population size and  degree  of  urbanisation  as  being
positively and significantly related to the fiscal independence or fiscal power of a
local government. It is generally accepted that there is  a  very  strong  relationship













In addition, every commentator on urban inequality has argued  for  a  very  strong
association between geographical location (north/south, east/west, white region/non-
white region, etc.) and the fiscal independence of  local  government  (Chakravorty,
1996; Cheshire and Carbonaro, 1996). Hence:
H1:  Fiscal  independence  (fin)  is  directly  and  positively  affected  by
population size (H1a) and degree of urbanisation (H1b). Fiscal independence
is also affected by geographical location (H1c).
It  is  acceptable to  hypothesise  that  political  party  composition  is  affected  by
population size and degree of urbanisation. The pattern of the effect of demographic
variables on the political variable varies from one country to another. In Britain, it is
assumed that the less urban the local authority is and the smaller the population of a
local authority is, the more Conservative the local authority will be (Byrne, 1994:
150-4; Hampton, 1987: 120; 1991: 128; Stoker, 1991: 40-9).
Political scientists studying  voting behaviour point  out  that  social and  economic
factors such as social class, income level, degree of education, etc. can be important
determinants of political ideology. It is generally accepted by political theory that the
higher the income level of residents in a local authority area, the more likely it is that
they will support the Conservatives. Sharpe and Newton (1984: 177) support this
argument, stating that Labour authorities are generally poor and that their purchasing
power seems to be relatively low.
In view of these arguments, it is hypothesised that in Britain, local authorities with
high fiscal independence are more likely to have a high proportion of Conservative
local  councillors.  Finally,  it  is  generally  accepted  by  political  scientists  that  the
political  party  composition  of  local  authorities  varies  according  to  geographical
location (Painter, 1995). Hence:8
H2: The proportion of Conservative councillors (con) in the total number of
councillors  in  local  government  is  directly  and  negatively  affected  by
population size (H2a) and  degree of urbanisation (H2b), as well as being
directly  and  positively  affected  by  fiscal  independence  (H2c).  The
proportion  of  Conservative  councillors  is  also  affected  by  geographical
location (H2d).
The characteristics of Labour Party councillors are understood  to  be  opposite  to
those  of  Conservative  Party  councillors  mentioned  above.  Often  coming  from
working-class backgrounds and with a history  of  active involvement in  the  trade
union movement, these councillors have pioneered innovations and developments in
welfare services (Goss, 1989).
It is expected that, in Britain, the more urban the local authority is and the bigger the
population size of the local authority, the higher will be the proportion of Labour
councillors  (Byrne,  1994:  150-4;  Hampton,  1991:  128;  Stoker,  1991:  40-9).  In
addition, in view of the general ideological characteristics of Labour, it is theoretically
assumed that a local authority with a high level of financial independence is likely to
have a low proportion of Labour councillors. In accordance with the hypothesis made
above, it is hypothesised that the proportion of Labour councillors varies according
to geographical location. Hence:
H3:  The  proportion  of  Labour councillors  (lab)  in  the  total  number  of
councillors  in  local  government  is  directly  and  positively  affected  by
population size (H3a) and degree of urbanisation (H3b), as well as  being
directly,  and  negatively  affected  by  fiscal  independence  (H3c).  The
proportion of Labour councillors is also affected by geographical location
(H3d).9
It is assumed that in a situation where the population size, degree of urbanisation and
fiscal independence of a local authority are high, the local authority can effectively
resist a policy imposed from above without fear of  sanctions.  Power-dependence
theory (Wilson and Game, 1994: 110-12) implies that the local authority which has
sufficient resources is likely to be more powerful in negotiating or bargaining with
central government. Accordingly, it is assumed that a local  authority  with  a  high
population size, a high degree of fiscal independence and a high degree of urbanisation
will be the target of more sanctions from central government during the CCT process.
As regards the relationship between sanctions and political party composition, it is
understood that the Labour Party tends to resist the Conservative-initiated policy of
CCT, whereas the Conservative Party tends to comply with it, leading us to expect
that Labour councils are more likely to incur sanctions issued by central government
than Conservative councils.
As Sharpe and Newton (1984) note, a policy has different effects in different regions,
which means that local authorities may take different attitudes  towards  the  same
policy. It is hypothesised that the number of the sanctions issued against a  local
authority by central government can vary acccording to geographical location. Hence:
H4: The number of sanctions issued against a local authority (san) is directly
and positively affected by population  size  (H4a),  degree  of  urbanisation
(H4b), fiscal  independence (H4c)  and    proportion  of  Labour councillors
(H4d), as well as being directly and negatively affected by proportion of
Conservative councillors (H4e). The number of sanctions issued against local
government is also affected by geographical location (H4f).
Considering  the  local  authority’s  scale  of  economy  and  its  ability  to  make
arrangements for a large contract, it is hypothesised that in a situation where  the
population size, degree of urbanisation and fiscal independence of the local authority10
are high,  the  contract  size  will be  relatively  large.  Furthermore,  the  size  of  the
contract will have a significant impact on the  cost  of  the  monitoring  procedures.
Hence it is expected that contract size will be associated with the ability of the local
authority to implement the contract effectively.
From the perspective of small business, contract size strongly affects the ability to
compete, and thus the success of the small firm depends on the size of the contract
that the local authority is putting out (Abbott et al., 1996). In view of this, Abbott et
al.  hypothesise  that  authorities  controlled  by  the  Conservatives  will  be  more
favourable to small businesses, allowing them to win more CCT work. In addition,
considering that the Labour Party has been politically hostile towards CCT,  it  is
hypothesised  that  Labour-controlled  councils  prefer  lager  contracts,  whereas
Conservative councils prefer small ones.
As regards the relationship between contract size and sanctions, it is assumed that a
local authority which has experienced the sanctions issued by central government is
more likely to make the contract smaller, because the setting-up of too big a contract
is regarded as a strategy employed by a local authority to prevent private contractors
from tendering for it. In addition, it is hypothesised that contract size is associated
with geographical location, because it can also be affected by regional factors. Hence:
H5: The size of the contract (size) is directly and positively affected  by
population size (H5a), degree  of  urbanisation  (H5b),  fiscal independence
(H5c) and proportion of Labour councillors (H5d), as well as being directly
and negatively affected by the proportion of Conservative councillors (H5e)
and the number of sanctions issued against the local authority (H5f). The
size of the contract is also affected by geographical location (H5g).
As Sharp (1990: 115) has noted, whether the location of a local authority is urban or
rural affects its ability to prepare and implement the contract. As the population of a11
local authority increases and the local authority becomes urban, it is assumed that
there will be a corresponding increase in the contract period.
As regards the relationship between political party  composition  and  the  contract
period, the period for which the contract is let can influence the level of competition.
A shorter contract period may, owing to high start-up costs, discourage competition
for the in-house tender (Prowle and Hines, 1989: 98). Therefore, it is hypothesised
that Labour councils prefer a shorter contract, whereas Conservative councils prefer a
longer contract.
Regarding the relationship between the contract period and the sanctions issued by
central government,  it  is  expected that  a  local  authority  which  has  experienced
sanctions issued by central government is more likely to make the contract period
longer, because private contractors prefer a longer contract to a shorter one. This is
because a longer contract can lower the transaction costs  incurred by  the  private
contractors.
As with contract size, it is hypothesised that the contract period differs according to
geographical location. Hence:
H6: The period of the contract (peri) is directly and positively affected by
population size (H6a), degree  of  urbanisation  (H6b),  fiscal independence
(H6c), proportion  of  Conservative  councillors  (H6d)  and  the  number of
sanctions issued against the local authority (H6e), as well as being directly
and negatively affected by the proportion of Labour councillors (H6f). The
period of the contract is also affected by geographical location (H6g).
The  main hypotheses  relating  to  DSO  output,  the  final dependent  variable,  are
directly connected with political, economic, demographic and strategic circumstances
in Britain. Drawing on the theoretical arguments about these facts advanced to date12
(Atkins, 1996; Boyne, 1996; Bulpitt, 1967; Carnaghan and Bracewell-Milnes, 1993;
Ferris, 1986; Wilson and Game, 1994), one can suggest the following hypotheses.
H7:  DSO  output  (dso)  is  directly  and  positively  affected  by  fiscal
independence (H5a) and proportion of Labour councillors (H5b), as well as
being directly and negatively affected by the  number of  sanctions  issued
against  the  local  authority  (H5c),  population  size  (H5d),  degree  of
urbanisation (H5e), proportion of Conservative councillors (H5f), the size of
the contract (H5g) and the period of the contract (H7h). DSO output is also
affected by geographical location (H7i).
Some researchers argue that political party effect on the policy output  is  crucial,
while others underestimate this effect. Stoker (1991: 37), in particular, characterises
the development of local government in the post-war period in Britain as involving a
shift from an apolitical climate to one of intensive ‘politicisation’. In this paper the
hypothesis is advanced, based on Stoker’s study, that the variable most crucial in
affecting DSO output is political party compostion. Hence:
H8: DSO output is more strongly  affected by  the  political  variable  (the
proportions  of  Labour  or  Conservative  councillors)  than  by  any  other
variable.13
Figure 2 shows the hypothesised causal model for analysis.
Figure 2 Hypothesised causal model
Key to abbreviations:
            pop = population size
            urb = degree of urbanisation
           geo = geographical location
            fin = fiscal independence
            con = proportion of Conservative Party councillors
            lab = proportion of Labour Party councillors
            san = number of sanctions issued against local government
            size = size of the contract
            peri =  period of  the contract
            dso = DSO proportion of total value of work
A number of specific terms are used in this study. These  terms  were  defined as










Table 1 Overview of variables and indicators used in the analysis
Variables Indicators Name of indicators
in text and tables
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Notes: (1) SSA (Standard Spending Assessment);  (2) dummy variable applied;
           (3) dummy variable applied
3 Analysis
3.1 The path model for 1991
Table 2 shows how the total effects of the independent variables are made up. The
estimation of path coefficients also makes it possible to decompose the  observed
empirical correlation or covariance between any two variables into two components:
direct and indirect effects. A direct effect is posited  as  existing  if  a  single  arrow
connects two variables. When two variables of interest are connected only via other
intervening  variables  -  when,  in  other  words,  the  relationship  is  represented  by15
compound paths with no direct path between the two variables of interest - the effect
is deemed to be indirect (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973: 314-5).
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As Table 2 shows, the direct and indirect relationships between the dependent and
independent variables are complicated. As regards DSO output for 1991, the political
variable (con and lab), one strategic variable (size) and one demographic variable (pop)
are directly related to it, while another strategic variable (geo), the economic variable
(fin)  and  another  demographic  variable  (urb)  are  indirectly  related.  These
relationships can be expressed in simple diagrammatic form.
As  Table  2  shows,  DSO  output  (dso),  the  final dependent  variable,  is  directly
affected by pop, con, lab and size, and indirectly by pop, geo and urb through the
mediation  of  con  and  lab.  In  other  words,  DSO  proportion  is  a  function  of
population size, proportion of Conservative and Labour councillors, contract size,
geographical location and degree of urbanisation. Of these, the political variable, the
proportion of Labour councillors (lab), has the greatest total effect on dso (0.37). It is16
accepted  that  where  there  is  a  high  proportion  of  Labour  councillors,  a  low
proportion  of  Conservative  councillors,  a  large  contract  size  or  a  low  level  of
population size, there will be a higher level of DSO output.
3.2 The path model for 1994
As Table 3 shows, the direct and indirect relationship of the variables in the data set
for  1994  is  simpler  than  that  for  1991.  DSO  output  was  directly  affected  by
proportion of Labour councillors (lab,0.18), proportion of Conservative councillors
(con, -0.11) and geographical location (dum3, North West, 0.26), and indirectly by
degree of urbanisation, population size, geographical  location (dum2,  6,  7,  8)  via
mediating  proportion  of  Labour  councillors  and  proportion  of  Conservative
councillors. It is true that, as in the 1991 path model, political party composition, lab
and con, was one of the important factors affecting DSO output. DSO output is a
function of lab, con, dum3, urb, pop, dum2, dum6, dum7 and dum8.  
What is noticeable in the path model for 1994 is that the variable of geographical
location emerged as one of the most important and direct factors in determining DSO
output. This suggests that private  companies  interested  in  CCT  chose  particular
regions as their main targets for competition in preference to other regions, believing
that these latter might disadvantage them or that they would not make profits  in
those regions.17





    Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect
fin urb
dum 5
      -0.20










      -0.29
       0.17
       0.15
       0.18

















       0.43
       0.11
      -0.12
      -0.14
      -0.36





















       0.16
       0.21
       0.00
       0.00
       0.00
       0.00
       0.00




















       0.17
       0.50

















       0.11
       0.18
       0.26
       0.00
       0.00
       0.00
       0.00
       0.00
       0.00





















One of the main differences between the 1991 and 1994 analyses is that, while in the
early stages of CCT the political factor was the strongest affecting DSO output, over
time  private  contractors  chose  specific  regions  as  a  strategic  base  according  to
previous  experience  and  expanded this  base  into  other  regions.  Goodwin  (1994)
explains  that  this  reflects  the  growth  strategy  that  was  employed  by  the
multinationals during  the  1980s,  when  their  policy  of  mergers  and  acquisitions
enabled  them  to  gain  bases  nationally.  It  appears  that  some  private  companies
employed the strategy of ‘base and spread’, with the result that geographical location
has been the strongest factor affecting DSO output.
These findings can be interpreted to mean  that,  where  the  proportion  of  Labour
councillors is high, the proportion of Conservative councillors is low, and especially
in the region of North West, there will be high levels of DSO output. In addition,
population  size,  degree  of  urbanisation  and  geographical  location (Yorkshire  and18
Humberside,  East  Anglia,  South  West  and  South  East)  affected  DSO  output
indirectly (positively or negatively). It can be seen from these results that the data set
for 1994 confirms that the political variables lab and con and one of the strategic
variables, geo, were the most powerful determinants of DSO output.  
4. Conclusions
We  developed  and  tested  a  framework  that  describes  DSO  output  and  its
relationships to several environmental variables surrounding local government CCT.
Via analysis of path coefficients and elimination of the weak paths, we subsequently
refined the originally hypothesised model to create a trimmed model that should be a
useful departure point for future researchers interested in understanding how DSO
output may be achieved. Four main points about these findings are worth stressing
briefly:
1. The results are generally not bad in statistical terms, in the sense that there are
some significant beta weights even though many hypotheses are rejected. However, it
should be noted that over the time-period 1991-1994, the political variable, political
party composition, and geographical location prove themselves to be among the most
powerful explanatory variables so far as DSO output is concerned. In other words, in
data sets for the two years, organisational and economic variables have been found
less useful than the political and geographical variable in explaining the variance in
DSO  outputs.
2.  Perhaps  the  most  significant  finding  was  that  in  the  earlier  stages  of  CCT
implementation it was the political variable that had the strongest effect on the DSO
proportion, whereas in the later stages, it was the geographical location that had the
strongest effect. This implies that over time local councillors’  involvement in  the
CCT process declined and instead the private sector played a very important role in
the CCT process.    19
In academic and practical literature on privatisation policy, the variable geographical
location has not received much attention up until now. Although this variable was not
significant in the analysis for 1991, in that for 1994 it was the most powerful factor
affecting DSO output, thus leading us to assume that the practices and pattern of
contracting in 1994 were different from in 1991.
3.  Despite  a  measure  of  inconsistency,  the  findings  provide  us  with  a  strong
indication that the political, demographic, strategic and organisational variables for the
two research periods are significant in explaining the variances in DSO  output.
4. Despite the methodological efforts, causal modelling does not seem to provide any
solution to the basic problem of how environmental factors can affect policy output -
DSO output, or tell us what role these factors play in this process. Our results imply
that another approach should be employed to answer this question.20
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